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Introduction
On 15 December, the Bank of England and the Centre for
Economic Policy Research hosted the third Monetary Policy
Roundtable.  These events are intended to provide a forum for
economists to discuss key issues affecting the design and
operation of monetary policy in the United Kingdom.(1) As
always, participants included a range of economists from
private sector financial institutions, academia and public
sector bodies.  At this third Roundtable there were two
discussion topics:   
• monetary policy and the current conjuncture;  and
• the recession and the UK labour market.
This note summarises the main points made by participants.
Since the Roundtable was conducted under the ‘Chatham
House Rule’, none of the opinions expressed at the meeting are
attributed to individuals.  The views expressed in this summary
do not represent the views of the Bank of England, the
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) or the Centre for Economic
Policy Research.
Monetary policy and the current conjuncture
Views about short-term economic prospects were generally
downbeat.  Although the cuts in Bank Rate since October
2008 had led to considerable reductions in households’ debt
interest payments, consumer spending had remained subdued
as households increased saving and began to repair their
balance sheets.  Household spending was likely to remain weak
in the near term, but there were different views about the
likely persistence of this weakness.  Some believed that the
recession would lead to a protracted period during which
consumers would be averse to borrowing and would seek to
reduce their leverage.  Participants pointed to previous
episodes of significant balance sheet restructuring — in the
United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden and Thailand — which had
lasted around six to eight years, although the unprecedented
nature of the current recession limited the insights from these
historical comparisons.
Others, however, thought that a persistent change in
consumer attitudes to debt was less likely.  Little of the rise in
household savings had been used to repay debt or accumulate
financial assets.  Instead, most of the savings had been
channelled into a further accumulation of housing assets.  That
was corroborated by the recent rally in house prices, which had
recovered much more quickly than in the 1990s recession.
Consequently, a recovery in the supply of mortgage credit
would likely lead to a reduction in the savings rate, and hence
slow the deleveraging process.  That, however, would also take
time — the banking system remained significantly impaired,
and although banks had begun to repair their balance sheets,
significant further adjustment was required.  Banks’ strategies
for raising capital and liquidity ratios and reducing leverage
multiples were likely to inhibit a rapid recovery in bank
lending.  As a result, tight credit conditions were likely to
remain a feature of the economic landscape for some time.
Participants noted that many macroeconomic models did not
account for the role of balance sheets and frictions in credit
markets.  As a result, such models have only been able to
provide limited insight into the economic impact of recent
developments in credit conditions.
Investment was also likely to remain subdued.  In part, that
reflected the wide margin of spare capacity in the economy.
But it also reflected the expected tightness of credit
conditions.  Although lenders had reported improvements in
corporate credit availability during the second half of 2009,
surveys of borrowers suggested that many companies,
particularly small and medium-sized businesses with limited or
no access to capital markets, had continued to find credit
conditions highly restrictive.  In addition, businesses’ desire to
reduce leverage further (following record levels of bank debt
repayment), was likely to restrict investment.  
Inventory levels had been cut back aggressively over the past
year.  A reduction in the pace of de-stocking would boost GDP
growth in the coming quarters.  But participants were sceptical
of any substantial increase in stock levels going forward.  The
stock-output ratio was close to its average of the past fifteen
years;  and some surveys suggested that the current level of
inventories was already deemed sufficient to meet expected
demand.  Moreover, tight credit conditions and the desire to
preserve buffers of working capital may encourage businesses
to hold lower levels of stocks than in the past.  Those
businesses which needed to increase stocks to provide for a
recovery in demand may find it difficult to raise the necessary
finance.  
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Participants noted that the fiscal plans outlined in the 
Pre-Budget Report 2009 (PBR) contained little news about the
timing, composition and extent of any further consolidation in
the public finances.  Many thought that the PBR projection of a
sharp rise in public sector debt relative to nominal GDP would
leave little headroom for any further fiscal expansion.  Other
countries, which had also experienced deteriorations in their
public finances, faced similar challenges.  
In the past, net trade had played an important role in the early
phases of economic recovery.  Participants discussed whether
the same would be true this time.  It was thought that the
significant exchange rate depreciation since the summer of
2007 should boost exports and reduce imports in the coming
quarters.  But some participants were cautious about a strong
recovery in net trade.  Tight credit conditions continued to
restrict activity in the export sector.  Some exporters whose
prices are fixed in local currency terms (ie in terms of the
currency of the foreign destination) had used the exchange
rate depreciation to boost their margins.  And some surveys
suggested that perceived export competitiveness had not risen
by as much as the exchange rate depreciation may have
implied.  
Monetary policy had been loosened significantly over the past
year.  Bank Rate had been reduced to 0.5%, and maintained at
that level for most of the year.  And in March 2009, the MPC
had embarked upon a programme of asset purchases financed
by the issuance of central bank reserves.  At its November
meeting, the Committee had voted to extend that programme
by £25 billion, to a total of £200 billion.  
Some participants questioned the efficacy of the Bank’s asset
purchases.  The introduction of quantitative easing in Japan
had not generated a rise in bank lending.  And some believed
that the Bank’s asset purchase programme would have only a
limited impact on an economy with few willing lenders and
weak private sector demand for credit.  As a result, those
participants advocated alternative policies, aimed at providing
credit more directly to the corporate sector.
Others argued that the MPC’s asset purchases were having a
demonstrable impact on the economy.  Corporate bond yields
had fallen and stock markets had rallied markedly since March.
These developments had both reduced the cost of corporate
debt and equity issuance, which had risen to record levels.
These improvements in debt markets had enabled businesses
to repay bank loans, which in turn would help banks rebuild
their balance sheets.  But some participants were concerned
that policy had served to reinflate asset prices and spending,
and hence hinder the necessary adjustment in private sector
balance sheets.  
CPI inflation was likely to rise over the coming months,
reflecting the reversal of the December 2008 cut in VAT and
(for some) the continued impact of the past depreciation of
sterling.  Thereafter CPI inflation was likely to fall back sharply,
and remain subdued in the medium term.  Some participants
attributed this underlying weakness in inflation to the
significant margin of spare capacity that had emerged during
the recession, which would bear down on prices going forward.
Others, who had questioned the impact of the output gap on
prices, attributed the expected weakness of inflation to a
prolonged period of balance sheet adjustment and the
associated weakness in money and credit growth.
The recession and the UK labour market
The second discussion topic at the Roundtable centred on the
response of the UK labour market to the recent recession.  The
labour share of income (which accounts for changes in both
earnings and the number of people employed) had risen in line
with the experiences of the 1980s and 1990s recessions.  But
compared to these past recessions, the current episode had a
number of important differences:  output had fallen by
significantly more;  employment had fallen by significantly
less;  and wage growth had moderated markedly.  Roundtable
participants discussed a number of possible explanations.
Some attributed the limited response of employment to an
increase in wage flexibility — wage growth had moderated
markedly over the past year, enabling businesses to hoard
more labour than in previous recessions.  But others thought
that the labour share of income would need to fall back
substantially.  And the relationship between vacancies and
unemployment, another proxy for changes in labour market
flexibility, had remained little changed since the previous
recession.  
Others thought that the disparity between the falls in output
and employment, and the precipitous decline in labour
productivity they implied, suggested that either the decline in
output had been overestimated, or the fall in employment
underrecorded.  But there was a lot of evidence against this
view.  Output had fallen sharply all over the world:  the fall in
other countries’ output was corroborating evidence that
output had fallen sharply in the United Kingdom too.  As for
employment, the data may not properly capture migrants who
have lost their jobs and returned home.  But these were likely
to be concentrated in certain sectors such as construction, and
falls in employment had been broad-based across all sectors.
The limited response of employment in the United Kingdom
stood in stark contrast to the marked rise in unemployment in
the United States.  Participants noted that comparing the
behaviour of these two labour markets may help to shed light
on the unusual behaviour of the UK labour market.  Some
attributed the pronounced rise in US unemployment to the
fact that wage growth outstripped that of labour productivity
prior to the recession.  Earnings should grow in line with
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weaker earnings growth or higher productivity growth was
required.  The significant reductions in US employment may
have been part of this adjustment.  
It was noted that some of the rise in US unemployment may
also reflect a growing degree of ‘mismatch’ in the labour
market, with employers finding it increasingly difficult to
recruit appropriately skilled staff to fill their vacancies.  The
number of vacancies in the United States had remained little
changed of late despite increases in unemployment, which was
consistent with an increase in mismatch.
Participants thought the outlook for the UK labour market to
be highly uncertain.  The muted rise in unemployment may in
part reflect lags in the labour market.  Some businesses may
have chosen to hoard labour in the expectation of an
economic recovery, which, if proved unfounded, could lead to
a further rise in unemployment.  And although pay prospects
remained muted, wage growth had exceeded productivity
growth in Q2, suggesting that some further moderation in
earnings growth may be required to prevent additional cuts in
employment.  The upcoming round of wage negotiations and
the degree of restraint employees exerted in their wage
demands would have a material influence on the outlook for
employment.  Finally, the planned fiscal consolidation may
entail some reduction in public sector employment, which had
continued to increase in recent quarters.  This would put
upward pressure on unemployment. 
On balance, participants expected unemployment to peak
lower than in previous recessions.  But many expected hiring
to remain subdued and that unemployment would stay high
for longer than in previous similar episodes, with businesses
choosing to work their employees more intensively, rather
than recruiting new staff.  